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COMMENT
Peace on Earth, Goodwill in Divorce: Revisiting Travis in
Light of Oklahoma’s Revised Ethical Rule Allowing the
Sale of Law Practice Goodwill
She cried, and the judge wiped her tears with my checkbook.1
I. Introduction
Consider for a moment this hypothetical.  The year is 2008.  Abe Lawyer
has been a sole practitioner in Oklahoma for years, and much to his surprise,
his practice is quite profitable.  His reputation as counsel for medical
malpractice plaintiffs is outstanding.  With potential clients and referrals
coming in from all over the state, Abe knows that his future will have few
financial bounds if everything stays on course.  Unfortunately, while he climbs
the ladder of success within his legal profession, his marriage plummets. 
Abe’s marriage to his wife, Oasis, turned out to be a mirage, and in the words
of famous country singer Tammy Wynette, it is time for a “D-I-V-O-R-C-E.”2
Abe calls Beth Counsel and prepares to divide all he has acquired during
his marriage to Oasis.  Beth Counsel, a law school friend who handles
divorces, advises him to prepare a list of all assets and liabilities acquired
during his marriage, including his solo law practice.  Despite his successful
law practice, Abe begins to worry because he does not have liquid cash to
satisfy a property division of his practice.  Almost everything Abe has in his
practice is tied up in contingency fee cases, which he knows are not
guaranteed recoveries.  In fact, he could actually incur a substantial loss on
litigation expenses if a jury comes back with a verdict for the defense.  Beth
tells Abe not to worry because his law practice and livelihood are safe.  She
explains that while Oasis has the right to an equitable division of marital
property, including Abe’s office furnishings and equipment and the right to
use his projected earning capacity to seek support alimony, Oklahoma law
protects the goodwill Abe has accumulated in his law practice from division
as a marital asset.   Has Beth given Abe good advice?3
1. Cathy Meyer, Funny Divorce Quotes, http://divorcesupport.about.com/b/2007/08/29/
funny-divorce-quotes.htm (Aug. 29, 2007) (quoting Tommy Manville).  Manville was married
thirteen times to eleven different women.  Id.
2. TAMMY WYNETTE, D-I-V-O-R-C-E (Epic Records 1968).
3. Travis v. Travis, 1990 OK 57, ¶¶ 11-13, 795 P.2d 96, 100 (holding that the reputation
of a lawyer could not be purchased by another; therefore, the law practice at issue had no
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Effective January 1, 2008, Oklahoma adopted the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) newest version of Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.17.   Under both the ABA Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of4
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.17 allows and provides guidelines for the ethical
sale of a law practice.   While Oklahoma’s 2008 version of Rule 1.17 affords5
substantially more protection to clients than its ABA counterpart, the main
features of both the ABA model rule and the Oklahoma rule are the same.  6
Subject to only a few restrictions, both rules explicitly allow the sale of a law
practice along with such practice’s goodwill.   Goodwill, under Oklahoma7
goodwill for the purpose of dividing the marital estate).
4. Application of the Okla. Bar Ass’n to Amend the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2007 OK
22, ¶ 1, 171 P.3d 780, 780.
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2007); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2007); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2007); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).  Oklahoma Rule 1.17 currently states:
A lawyer or a law firm (or the authorized representative of a lawyer or a law firm)
may sell or purchase a law practice, or an area of practice, including good will, if
the following conditions are satisfied:
XX(a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of
practice that has been sold, in the geographic area in Oklahoma in which the
practice has been conducted; and
XX(b) The entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to one or more
lawyers or law firms, except that (1) the representation of any client who does not
consent as provided in paragraph (c) shall not be transferred; (2) matters shall not
be transferred to a purchaser unless the seller has reasonable basis to believe that
the purchaser has the requisite knowledge and skill to handle such matters, or
reasonable assurances are obtained that such purchaser will either acquire such
knowledge and skill or associate with another lawyer having such competence; (3)
matters shall not be transferred to a purchaser who would not be permitted to
assume such representation by reason of restrictions contained in Rules 1.7
through 1.10 or other Rules; and (4) where matters in litigation are involved, any
necessary judicial approvals of the transfer of representation must be obtained.
XX(c) The seller or the seller’s representative shall give written notice to each
client whose representation is proposed to be transferred, stating: (1) a sale of the
entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is proposed; (2) a transfer of the
representation of such client to a specified lawyer, lawyers, or law firm is
contemplated; (3) the client has the right to take possession of the file and retain
other counsel; (4) the existence and status of any funds or property held for the
client, including but not limited to retainers or other prepayments; and (5) the fact
that the client’s consent to the transfer of the client’s files will be presumed if he
client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90)
days of the date of the notice.
XX The signed written consent of each client whose representation is proposed
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law, is the “value that results from the probability that old customers will
continue to trade with an established concern.”8
The concept of ethically providing for the sale of law practices is not a new
concept to Oklahoma.  In 1995, Oklahoma adopted its original version of Rule
1.17, which allowed lawyers to sell their practices if they completely ceased
the private practice of law in Oklahoma.   Prior to the enactment of this rule,9
lawyers in Oklahoma could not sell their law practices because in doing so,
they would violate their professional duty to refrain from obtaining a
proprietary interest in client matters and their duty to avoid an unethical
division of fees.   Once Oklahoma adopted Rule 1.17, it served its purpose by10
allowing attorneys to wind down their practices in the event of retirement,
relocation, or in hopes of judicial or legislative office.   Under both the new11
and old Rule 1.17, attorneys selling their practices can receive the
compensation they have already earned while they also ensure their clients
receive new representation.   Yet, Oklahoma’s original rule allowed only for12
the sale of the law practice itself, not its goodwill.13
to be transferred to a purchaser must be obtained; provided that the client’s
consent to the transfer of the client’s files shall be presumed if the client does not
take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety (90) days of the date of
the notice.  If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may
be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a
court having jurisdiction.  The seller may disclose to the court in camera
information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an
order authorizing the transfer of a file.
XX(d) The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless
the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees
charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the
initiation of the purchase negotiations.
Id.
8. Freeling v. Wood, 1961 OK 113, ¶ 12, 361 P.2d 1061, 1063.
9. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008).
10. Travis v. Travis, 1990 OK 57, ¶ 11, 795 P.2d 96, 100.
11. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008).
12. Id.
13. Id.  Oklahoma’s old rule stated:
A lawyer (or the authorized representative of a lawyer) who ceases to engage in
the private practice of law in Oklahoma may sell the law practice of such a lawyer
to a lawyer or law firm, and a lawyer or law firm may purchase that law practice,
if the following conditions are satisfied:
XX(a) The practice is sold in its entirety, except that (1) the representation of any
client who does not affirmatively consent as provided in paragraph (c) shall not
be transferred; (2) matters shall not be transferred to a purchaser unless the seller
has a reasonable basis to believe that the purchaser has the requisite knowledge 
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The chart below indicates the major distinctions between Oklahoma’s old and
new Rule of Professional Conduct 1.17.  14
and skill to handle such matters, or reasonable assurances are obtained that such
purchaser will either acquire such knowledge and skill or associate with another
lawyer having such competence; (3) matters shall not be transferred to a purchaser
who would not be permitted to assume such representation by reason of
restrictions contained in Rules 1.7 through 1.12 or other Rules; and (4) where
matters in litigation are involved, any necessary judicial approvals of the transfer
of representation must be obtained.
XX(b) The seller or the seller’s representative shall give written notice to each
client whose representation is proposed to be transferred, stating: (1) The lawyer
is ceasing to engage in the private practice of law in Oklahoma; (2) the practice
of the lawyer is to be sold; (3) a transfer of the representation of such client to a
specified lawyer or law firm is proposed; (4) the client has the right to take
possession of the file and retain other counsel; (5) the existence and status of any
funds or property held for the client, including but not limited to retainers or other
prepayments; and (6) the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement
within the limits authorized by paragraph (e).
XX(c) The signed consent of each client whose representation is proposed to be
transferred to a purchaser must be obtained on a copy of the written notice
provided for in paragraph (b), and such form of written notice shall also provide
a space for the client to direct another disposition of the file.
XX(d) No attorney-client communications or other confidential information
protected by Rule 1.6 shall be revealed to a purchaser or prospective purchaser
unless the client’s consent to the transfer of representation has first been obtained
as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c).
XX(e) The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale.  The
purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client
consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the
purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the
purchase negotiations.
XX(f) A reasonable effort shall be made to locate each client whose representation
is proposed to be transferred, but if such client cannot be located, then the seller
of the practice must make appropriate arrangements with another lawyer or law
firm who would be qualified to assume such representation, who need not be the
purchaser of the practice.  Any such files shall be segregated by the receiving
lawyer or law firm for safekeeping and held for disposition as the client may direct
when located.
XX(g) The custody of inactive files representing matters which have been
concluded, or with respect to which no current activities are occurring or
contemplated, shall only be transferred in accordance with the applicable
provisions of paragraphs (b) and  (c) or (f), as the case may be.
Id.
14. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008).
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Pre-2008 
Rule 1.17
2008 
Rule 1.17
Allows sale of entire law practice Yes Yes
Allows sale of law “practice
areas”
No Yes
Specifically allows for the sale of
law practice goodwill
No Yes
Requires cessation of private
practice of law in entire state of
Oklahoma
Yes No
Requires cessation of private
practice in geographical area of
Oklahoma where sold practice was
located
Yes Yes
Allows judicial consent to transfer
clients who cannot be contacted 
No Yes
Prohibits transfer of confidential
client information to potential
purchaser
Yes  No
Requires purchasing attorney
NOT to increase fees
Yes No
Since an attorney could sell neither a law practice nor its goodwill under
the ethical rules prior to the adoption of Rule 1.17, when the case of Travis v.
Travis reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1990, the court ruled that a
lawyer’s goodwill in his or her practice could not be a marital asset subject to
division in a divorce proceeding.   To the court, a lawyer’s professional15
goodwill was personal because “the reputation of [a] lawyer cannot be
purchased by another.”   When Oklahoma originally adopted Rule of16
Professional Conduct 1.17 in 1995, no language spoke to the nature or even
existence of an attorney’s goodwill.   Since Travis held that lawyers had only17
non-saleable, personal goodwill, the passage of the original version of Rule
1.17 without reference to the ability to sell goodwill implicitly adopted Travis;
there was no need to address the sale of something the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had already declared nonexistent.  Despite years of reliance on the
Travis construction of attorney goodwill as personal, the 2008 Oklahoma Rule
15. Travis, ¶ 13, 795 P.2d at 100. 
16. Id. ¶ 11, 795 P.2d at 100.
17. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008); see supra note 13
(full text of R. 1.17 prior to the 2008 amendment).
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of Professional Conduct 1.17 departed from precedent and statutorily codified
attorney goodwill as a saleable commodity, in exact opposition to Travis.  18
Therefore, under Oklahoma’s 2008 Rule of Professional Conduct 1.17, an
attorney’s goodwill and business reputation may now be bought and sold.19
By stating that a lawyer’s goodwill may be bought and sold, the 2008
version of Rule 1.17 has radically re-characterized the professional goodwill
of a practicing attorney from that of personal goodwill, which is generally
non-transferable, to enterprise goodwill, which is readily transferable with the
business to which it attaches.   Because a lawyer’s goodwill is now alienable,20
it can theoretically be divisible in a divorce proceeding as Oklahoma has done
with other professional practices.   This drastic change in Rule 1.17 places21
the fate of Travis and its classification of attorney goodwill as non-marital
property in the balance, as it threatens to overturn precedent relied upon by
Oklahoma practitioners for almost 19 years.  Nonetheless, this comment
argues that because the sale of a law practice and its goodwill is still as
untenable, impractical, and unlikely as it was when Travis was decided, the
2008 revision to Rule 1.17 should not result in overturning Travis.  Further,
a strict construction of Rule 1.17 may save Travis from certain death.
Part II of this comment examines goodwill, specifically addressing its
definition, origins, and common valuation methods, including the difficulties
experienced when trying to value such an intangible and erratic asset.  Part III
examines the current scheme for dividing marital property in Oklahoma,
including the equitable division of goodwill in the professional context.  It
particularly focuses on the sale of goodwill in the legal profession.  Part IV
considers the effect of the 2008 revision to Rule 1.17 on the viability of Travis
v. Travis and suggests that because the revised rule statutorily modifies the
Travis definition of goodwill from personal to enterprise goodwill, a lawyer’s
goodwill will very likely become a divisible marital asset.  Part IV also
suggests plausible alternatives to overturning Travis based upon the realities
faced by many solo or small firm practitioners and the many restrictions
inherent in Rule 1.17.  This comment concludes in Part V.
18. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
19. Id.
20. Id.; see David H. Levy, The Nature of the Beast: Hunting (Professional) Goodwill, 25
FAM. ADVOC. 31, 31 (2003) (explaining the difference between personal goodwill and enterprise
goodwill).
21. See Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1995 OK 22, 891 P.2d 1277, superceded by statute on other
grounds as stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29.  Traczyk was superceded by
statute only as to the section of the decision discussing the computation of interest according
to 12 OKLA. STAT. § 727 (2001), which in no way affects its validity for the purpose of
discussion in this Comment.  Cox v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025,
1028-29.
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II. Goodwill: A Quick Look at an Expansive Concept
A. Defining Goodwill—Many Definitions, One General Trend
The oldest known decision on goodwill appears in the 1690 case Broad v.
Jollyfe  where the court concluded that goodwill “is but the selling of his22
custom and leaving another to gain it.”   Given Broad’s lack of clarity23
regarding the concept of goodwill, a better known description of goodwill is
found within an 1810 discussion in Crutwell v. Lye, which involved the sale
of a country waggoner’s goodwill.   In Crutwell, Lord Chancellor Eldon24
defined the term as “nothing more than the probability that the old customers
will return to the old place.”   Similarly, in the 1842 case of England v.25
Downs, Lord Langdale defines goodwill as “the chance or probability that
custom will be had at a certain place of business, in consequence of the way
in which that business has been carried on.”   Shortly thereafter, courts26
described goodwill as: “[w]hen a trade is established in a particular place, the
goodwill of that trade means nothing more than the sum of money any person
would be willing to give for the chance of being able to keep the trade
connected with the place where it has been carried on.”27
Early American decisions describe goodwill in similar terms.  Rowell v.
Rowell, a 1904 case from Wisconsin, colorfully described goodwill as “a sort
of beaten pathway from the seller to the buyer,”  and in the same year, a28
California court in Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge defined goodwill in more
explicit prose as “a well-founded expectation of continued public
patronage.”   Vonderbank v. Schmidt, an early Louisiana case, described29
goodwill as “an advantage or benefit which is acquired by a business
establishment beyond the mere intrinsic value of the capital stock; . . . it is the
general public patronage and encouragement which a business receives from
its customers on account of its local position.”30
Because definitions of goodwill have evolved over many years, finding a
single, uniform definition is a difficult task.  Today, two distinct definitions
22. (1620) 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B.). 
23. Gabriel A. D. Preinreich, The Law of Goodwill, 11 ACCT. REV. 317, 317 (1936)
(quoting Broad, 79 Eng. Rep. at 510).
24. Id. (citing Crutwell v. Lye, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (Ch.)).
25. Id. (quoting Crutwell, 34 Eng. Rep. at 134).
26. Id. (quoting England v. Downs, (1842) 49 Eng. Rep. 829, 832-33).
27. Id. (quoting Austen v. Boys, (1858) 44 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1136 (Ch.)).
28. 99 N.W. 473, 478 (Wis. 1904).
29. 78 P. 879, 882 (Cal. 1904).
30. 10 So. 616, 619 (La. 1892).
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have emerged for goodwill depending upon the field in which the concept
arises—a factor which further complicates the task of defining goodwill.  31
First, the economic or accounting definition of goodwill focuses on goodwill
as an asset of a business, generally characterizing it as the “excess of the
‘normal rate of return for the identifiable tangible and intangible assets used
in [a] given business.’”   The computation of goodwill under the economic32
definition requires the consideration of the following sources of goodwill: (1)
strategic location; (2) effective advertising; (3) the value of a skilled, trained
workforce; (4) assemblage of property and equipment in a productive
arrangement; and (5) the systems, controls, and management procedures
developed as a part of any operation.33
By contrast, the legal definition of goodwill describes it as the continued
patronage of customers with a certain business.   The legal definition of34
goodwill generally ignores all other sources of goodwill other than return
business and reputation.   Black’s Law Dictionary takes both the economic35
and legal definitions into consideration and defines goodwill as “[a] business’s
reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when
appraising the business, [especially] for purchase; the ability to earn income
in excess of the income that would be expected from the business viewed as
a mere collection of assets.”36
Although two prevailing definitions exist, Oklahoma has adopted the
continued public patronage, or legal, definition of goodwill by codifying the
definition of goodwill as “the expectation of continued public patronage, but
it does not include a right to use the name of any person from whom it was
acquired.”   As such, case law applying the Oklahoma rule has interpreted37
goodwill as the “value that results from the probability that old customers will
31. Helga White, Comment, Professional Goodwill: Is It a Settled Question or Is There
Value in Discussing It?, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 495, 497 (1998) (“Defining
goodwill is a complicated task.  In part this is due to distinctions between the legal definition
of goodwill and an accounting or economics definition.”).
32. Id. (quoting Allen Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce
Proceedings, 18 FAM. L.Q. 213, 214 (1984)).
33. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Identifying & Valuing Goodwill at Divorce, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 221-22 (1993).
34. White, supra note 31, at 498.
35. Gary S. Rosin, The Hard Heart of the Enterprise: Goodwill & the Role of the Law
Firm, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 315, 320 (1998).
36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (8th ed. 2004).
37. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 315 (2001).
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continue to trade with an established concern.”   Additionally, a business’s38
goodwill constitutes transferable property in Oklahoma.39
Defining the term does not negate additional complications.  Goodwill can
be further divided into specific categories.  Depending upon its source,
goodwill must be either enterprise or personal and either commercial or
professional.   Sometimes these categories overlap, and determining in which40
category an asset belongs is not always clear.  Despite this complication,
general analytical principles exist.   If the goodwill is intrinsic to the practice41
itself, it is labeled as enterprise goodwill.   Enterprise goodwill is not42
contingent upon any single person.  It depends upon the location of the office,
the reputation of the business as a whole for quality service, and the “local
flavor of the practice.”   On the other hand, personal goodwill is dependant43
upon the person, and comes from the person’s “reputation, accolades, and
unique professional accomplishments.”   Commercial goodwill resembles44
enterprise goodwill and encompasses that which comes from a commercial
establishment, like a store or manufacturing plant, whereas professional
goodwill resembles personal goodwill and inheres in individuals and their
particular skill sets.   While these classifications seems arbitrary, they are45
legally important because professional and personal goodwill are generally
nontransferable and unmarketable.46
Although courts, businesses, and other entities have struggled with the
concept of goodwill for years, goodwill in the legal profession is a relatively
new phenomenon.  While the physical assets of a law office could always be
sold, sale of the entire practice, including clients and open cases, was
generally prohibited before 1990.   Without the adoption of Rule 1.17, a47
lawyer selling his practice would violate Oklahoma Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.8, which bars an attorney from obtaining a proprietary interest in
38. Freeling v. Wood, 1961 OK 113, ¶ 12, 361 P.2d 1061, 1063.
39. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 316.
40. Levy, supra note 20, at 31.
41. White, supra note 31, at 501-14 (identifying and discussing the methods courts use in
distinguishing between enterprise and personal goodwill as well as distinguishing between
commercial and professional goodwill).
42. Levy, supra note 20, at 31.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. White, supra note 31, at 499-500.
46. Id. at 499.
47. Barton T. Crawford, Comment, The Sale of a Legal Practice in North Carolina: 
Goodwill and Discrimination Against the Sole Practitioner, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 993,
994-95 (1997).
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a client’s case.   The selling attorney would also violate Oklahoma Rule of48
Professional Conduct 1.5 by splitting a fee with the purchasing attorney unless
the selling attorney assumed joint responsibility for any case with the
purchasing attorney.   Retaining such responsibility might defeat the purpose49
of the sale especially if the selling attorney is trying to end his or her practice. 
Yet, the concerns regarding these Rule violations were alleviated by the
adoption of Rule 1.17, which implicitly approved such violations by allowing
law practice sales.
The ABA best summarizes the general rationale for preventing attorneys
from selling their practices in the comments to Rule 1.17, which state: “The
practice of law is a profession, not merely a business.  Clients are not
commodities that can be purchased and sold at will.”   Nonetheless,50
Oklahoma, following the suit of many other states, adopted the ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.17 with revisions, and the sale of a law
practice, including goodwill, is now permissible in Oklahoma.   Because51
attorney goodwill can now be sold, the viability of Travis is in question.  In
the event that Travis is overturned, goodwill of a legal practice would
constitute marital property, and Oklahoma courts would be faced with how to
determine the value of such goodwill.  While the procedure appears simple,
valuing goodwill has perplexed courts for years.
B. Valuing Goodwill—A Question of What, Not How
Valuing goodwill is a speculative, inexact guessing game, leading one
professional to label it as one of “the most challenging aspects of a
matrimonial case.”   Goodwill is fickle, and “[i]ts value may rise and fall over52
the course of its life in response to extrinsic as well as intrinsic factors.”   For53
instance, the entrance, exit, or failure of a competitor can cause goodwill to
48. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (Supp. 2008); see Travis v. Travis, 1990
OK 57, ¶ 11, 975 P.2d 96, 100.
49. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (Supp. 2008); see Travis, ¶ 11, 975 P.2d
at 100.  Rule 1.5(e) states:
A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made
only if: (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer
or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client
agrees to the arrangement and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and (3) the
total fee is reasonable.
OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 cmt. 1 (2007).  Oklahoma has also adopted
this comment.  OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 cmt. 1 (Supp. 2008).
51. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
52. Levy, supra note 20, at 34.
53. Blumberg, supra note 33, at 222.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/4
2008] COMMENT 595
rise or fall, as can effective advertising.   Despite these factors and the54
fluctuation potential they create, a professional spouse’s goodwill must be
valued if it is to be divided as marital property in a divorce.55
A vast array of goodwill valuation methods exists, and which method the
expert uses could strikingly alter outcomes.   Courts generally consider some56
form of the following factors as relevant to valuating professional goodwill,
regardless of the valuation method used:
! The practitioner’s age, health, past demonstrated earning power
! The practitioner’s professional reputation in the community as
to his or her judgment, skill, and knowledge
! The practitioner’s comparative professional success
! The nature and duration of the practitioner’s business as a sole
practitioner or as a member of a partnership or professional
corporation to which his or her professional efforts have made a
proprietary contribution.57
Nonetheless, most courts have declined to adopt one specific method of
valuation for all goodwill divisions, inviting attorneys to argue for the
valuation method most helpful to their client’s cause.   Part II.A.2 below58
discusses the five most common methods of goodwill valuation at length,
including any valuation method specifically approved or rejected in
Oklahoma.  Nevertheless, before even attempting to approach valuation
methods, the court must determine the appropriate standard of value.
1. Standards of Value
When valuing a closely held business, such as a solo practice or closely
held partnership, an appraiser must use the appropriate standard of value, and
the judge and any readers of the appraisal must understand exactly what
standard of value is being used.   Defining the standard of value is59
particularly important because value is a relative term.   The most common60
standards of value used for appraisal of a closely held business in a divorce
situation are fair market value and fair value.  Additionally, other standards
used for divorce valuation include book value, adjusted book value, going
54. Id. at 221-22.
55. For the distinction in outcomes between dividing goodwill as marital property and using
future earnings to determine support awards, see infra notes 178-99 and accompanying text.
56. White, supra note 31, at 515.
57. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 582 (2007).
58. White, supra note 31, at 515-16.
59. ROBERT E. KLEEMAN, JR. ET AL., THE HANDBOOK FOR DIVORCE VALUATIONS 7 (1999).
60. Id.
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concern value, investment value, and liquidation value.   Each of these61
standards must be explored to determine the legal consequences of dividing
attorney goodwill.
Fair market value is the most commonly used standard of value in the
appraisal of a closely held business and is defined in the Business Valuation
Standards of the American Society of Appraisers as “[t]he amount at which
property would change hands between a willing seller and a willing buyer
when neither is under compulsion and when both have reasonable knowledge
of the relevant facts.”   Fair market value assumes neither party is under62
duress to buy or sell, and the parties are conducting an arms-length transaction
where each party has reasonable knowledge of the facts necessary to make an
informed decision to buy or sell.   Fair market value is also based on a63
transaction with a hypothetical buyer, as opposed to a specific buyer who
might pay more or less.   Fair value, on the other hand, is a statutorily or64
judicially defined standard of value that varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.   Divorce situations constitute the majority of cases applying the65
fair value standard, and when valuing a business using this method, an
appraiser will normally consider all elements of a business, such as assets,
income, cash flow, with the exception of the business’s investment value in the
actual marketplace.66
For assets, book value is “the capitalized cost of an asset less accumulated
depreciation, depletion, or amortization as it appears on the books of account
of [an] enterprise[,]” and for an entire business, book value is the “difference
between total assets (net of depreciation, depletion, and amortization) and
total liabilities of an enterprise as they appear on the [company’s] balance
sheet.”   Book value has also been called net book value, net worth, or67
shareholder equity.   Book value almost never equals fair market value and68
is an accounting fiction which only reflects the historic value of assets as of
the date they appeared on a company’s balance sheet less depreciation, which
may not have any relationship to the actual value of the assets.   Adjusted69
book value is the same as book value except that the business’s tangible assets
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. 
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are adjusted to their fair market value, and the total valuation may include
intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, or goodwill.70
Investment value is the value of a business to a specific buyer and is rarely
used in divorce matters as it may discount or inflate value based upon dealings
with one specific buyer.   Going concern value is a subset of standard of71
value and simply refers to the value of a business using any of the above
methods and assuming that the business will continue to operate into the
foreseeable future.   Finally, liquidation value is the value of a business72
assuming that the business’s operations have ceased, and the assets of the
business will be sold off on a piece by piece basis.   The liquidation valuation73
standard generally assumes that all of the business’s assets will be sold in an
orderly manner to achieve the highest price possible, yet forced liquidation is
always a possibility.   If forced liquidation is used as a standard of value, the74
necessity to sell assets as quickly as possible should be considered to
generally reduce the value of the business.75
2. Valuation Approaches
Before discussing any valuation methods, it should be noted that Oklahoma
affords the trial judge considerable discretion in determining the applicable
valuation method to be used in any particular circumstance.   In fact, the76
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals stated: “All methods of valuation need not
always be considered.  There is no definitive formula which when used in
computer-like manner results in a magical equation for fair value
determination—nor should there be.”   The trial judge has a duty to review77
all of the factors bearing on which method should be used because “[t]he
surrounding circumstances in each case differ,” and a “case-by-case approach
is indispensable” in the search for a fair value for an asset.   Nonetheless, if78
the court arrives at a value for the property in issue that is less than the
amounts stated by both of the parties’ experts, the valuation will be reversed.  79
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 9-10.
75. Id. at 10.
76. King v. Sw. Cotton Oil Co., 1978 OK CIV APP 19, ¶ 27, 585 P.2d 385, 392 (“The
question of what weight the trial court should assign the various methods of valuation is purely
one of judgment left to the prudent discretion of the trial judge.”).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Landers v. Landers, 2000 OK CIV APP 42, ¶¶ 9-10, 4 P.3d 51, 53-54.
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With Oklahoma’s extremely deferential standards in mind, the following
sections discuss the most common methods of valuation.
a) Capitalized Excess Earnings Method
The capitalized excess earnings method is probably the most common
method of goodwill valuation.   Traditionally, excess earnings are defined as80
“earnings above and beyond all identifiable inputs from labor, tangible assets,
and separable intangible assets.  Labor is defined as the market labor value of
the services of a person with the business or professional spouse’s education,
training, experience, and ability.”   The capitalized excess earnings method81
for valuation of goodwill of a law practice involves three steps.  First, a party
must determine the practice’s average net income for the past four or five
years before the practitioner’s compensation is deducted, eliminating any non-
recurring or unusual expenditures or revenues.   Second, a reasonable rate of82
return based upon the practice’s net tangible assets (usually eight to ten
percent) must be subtracted from the net income.   Third, a reasonable83
amount of compensation must be deducted for the sole practitioner.   This84
amount should be determined by taking into account what the practitioner
could make as an employee of a comparable firm in the geographic region and
the nature of the practice of law.   The remaining balance amounts to the85
practitioner’s goodwill.86
The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically approved the capitalized
excess earnings method in Dugan v. Dugan, in which the court explained its
reasoning for approving the method as follows:  “One appropriate method to
determine the value of goodwill of a law practice can be accomplished by
fixing the amount by which the attorney’s earnings exceed that which would
have been earned as an employee by a person with similar qualifications of
80. Rosin, supra note 35, at 350.  The excess earnings method has many variations, e.g.,
average earnings, capitalization of normalized earnings, etc.; however, as used in this Comment,
capitalized excess earnings refers to what has been called the “traditional” approach.  Blumberg,
supra note 33, at 264-65; Nina Fields, Note, The Sale of a Law Practice in South Carolina: The
Impact of Model Rule 1.17 on Sole Practitioners and their Clients, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1029, 1035-
36 (1999).
81. Blumberg, supra note 33, at 265.
82. Gayle L. Coy, Note, Permitting the Sale of a Law Practice: Furthering the Interests of
Both Attorneys and Their Clients, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 969, 984 (1994) (describing the steps
necessary to value a law firm’s goodwill through the capitalized excess earnings method).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 984-85.
86. Id. at 985.
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education, experience and capability.”   The Dugan court reasoned that this87
method is fair because an attorney who works solely as an employee in a firm
does not earn goodwill.  Therefore, the same attorney should not accumulate
any goodwill up to the amount he could earn in employment just because he
or she is a sole practitioner.88
The New Jersey Supreme Court then gave instructions for conducting a
capitalization analysis.  The court stated: “[F]irst ascertain what an attorney
of comparable experience, expertise, education and age would be earning as
an employee in the same general locale.  The effort that the practitioner
expends on his law practice should not be overlooked when comparing his
income to that of the hypothetical employee.”   The court placed critical89
emphasis on the workload of sole practitioners, noting that the number of
hours and time put into the practice by the sole practitioner, not the practice’s
inherent goodwill, could increase the practitioner’s income.   Thus, the90
attorney’s regular work habits should be taken into account.   The attorney’s91
net income before federal and state income taxes for preferably five years
should be averaged and then compared with the employee norm.   Any excess92
over the employee norm and the return on any tangible office assets (if any)
forms the number capitalized to determine goodwill.93
The court then explained that “[t]he capitalization factor is generally
perceived as the number of years of excess earnings a purchaser would be
willing to pay for in advance in order to acquire the goodwill.”   Determining94
such a factor would depend upon the evidence presented by the parties,
including a comparison of factors used in capitalization analyses for other
types of professional businesses.  These factors would then need to be
adjusted for “ingredients peculiar to law, such as the inability to sell the
practice and nonavailability of a restrictive covenant.”   The court also noted95
that the age of a lawyer “may be particularly important because a sole
practitioner’s goodwill would probably terminate upon death.”   However, the96
court in Dugan did not foreclose the use of other methods for valuing
87. 457 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1983).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9-10.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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goodwill, especially in the presence of other evidence befitting of alternative
valuation methods.97
The capitalized excess earnings method has both benefits and faults.  It has
been praised for avoiding the commingling of pre- and post-marital goodwill
because its formula requires the use of historical earnings.   It also has been98
praised for recognizing the “something special” about a professional practice,
known as goodwill.   This realization allows a non-professional spouse  to99 100
share in the value of the professional career that he or she usually helped the
other achieve.   Conversely, capitalization has been criticized as only a101
method of predicting future earnings, not valuing goodwill.   Further, the102
capitalized excess earnings method may produce unrealistic figures, which can
be of particular concern when professional spouses must liquidate tangible
assets to pay for intangible goodwill.   In addition, tampering by a103
professional spouse who keeps his or her earnings artificially low can skew
this formula.   For these reasons, Oklahoma has specifically rejected the104
capitalized excess earnings method as a valuation technique for goodwill in
divorce cases.105
b) Fair Market Value Method
The fair market value method is by far the simplest method for goodwill
valuation.   Fair market value is the amount a willing buyer would pay and106
the amount a willing seller would accept for the sale of a business.   In this107
method, a business’s goodwill is the difference between the going-concern
value, which is the amount for which the business itself or other comparable
businesses have been sold, and the liquidating value of the business’s assets.  108
The distinction between the going-concern value of a professional practice and
97. Id.
98. White, supra note 31, at 526.
99. Id. (quoting Andrew C. Mallor et al., A Professional’s Guide for Surviving Divorce in
Indiana, 37 RES GESTAE 112, 114-15 (1993)). 
100. “Non-professional spouse” as used throughout this Comment means the spouse of the
professional whose goodwill is being valued.  The use of non-professional in no way indicates
that the spouse is not also a professional.  Whether the spouse is professional or non-
professional, the analysis discussed will not change.
101. White, supra note 31, at 526.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 526-27.
104. Id. at 527.
105. Mocnik v. Mocnik, 1992 OK 99, ¶¶ 20-21, 838 P.2d 500, 505.
106. Rosin, supra note 35, at 350.
107. White, supra note 31, at 521.
108. Rosin, supra note 35, at 350.
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such practice’s goodwill is sometimes hyper-technical, and the following has
been offered by American Jurisprudence to distinguish the two: 
Goodwill and going-concern value are distinct; that is, going-
concern value refers generally to the ability of a business to
generate income without interruption, even where there has been
a change of ownership, whereas goodwill represents a preexisting
relationship arising from a continuous course of business which is
expected to continue indefinitely.109
Although the Oregon Court of Appeals expressed reluctance in valuing
goodwill in a law practice, it has applied the fair market valuation method to
determine the goodwill of a law practice.   The court reasoned that “such110
value should be determined with considerable care and caution, since it is a
unique situation in which the continuing practitioner is judicially forced to buy
an intangible asset at a judicially determined value and compelled to pay a
former spouse her share in tangible assets.”   Nevertheless, Oklahoma has111
approved the fair market valuation method as a proper method for valuing
other professionals’ businesses, like those of physicians, lending credence to
the acceptance of this method for valuing attorneys’ practices in Oklahoma.  112
At least two courts, Florida and Missouri, have held that fair market value is
the only acceptable method for assessing goodwill.113
The fair market value approach has three main benefits.  First, it eliminates
the consideration of post divorce earnings.   Second, it inherently separates114
the individual reputation of the professional from the other goodwill in the law
practice.   Third, it eliminates double awards in divorce settlements.   For115 116
instance, double dipping into the value of goodwill may occur when the
professional spouse’s income is used to compute goodwill, which would then
109. 24 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 57, § 582.
110. In re Marriage of Reiling, 673 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
111. Id. (quoting Lopez v. Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)).
112. Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1995 OK 22, ¶¶ 12-13, 891 P.2d 1277, 1280, superceded by statute
on other grounds as stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29 (determining the
goodwill of a podiatry clinic using the fair market value method by multiplying the previous
year’s gross income by the percentage of patients who would probably remain patrons of the
clinic).
113. Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So. 2d 267, 269-70 (Fla. 1991); Hanson v. Hanson, 738
S.W.2d 429, 434 (Mo. 1987).
114. White, supra note 31, at 522.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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be divided as a marital asset, and also used again to compute future income to
set a support award.117
Despite its benefits, the fair market valuation method also presents its share
of concerns.  It has been sharply criticized because the value it produces may
fall below the true value of the asset.   This is especially true when valuing118
professional goodwill, because the fair market value will often be based solely
on the tangible assets of a business.   When compared to other assets of a119
law practice, tangible assets like books and desks may not reflect the true
value of the business.   Further, because no actual or willing buyer exists and120
no sale will occur, all valuations are inherently unrealistic.   Another critique121
of this method is that very few or no sales of law practices occur to provide
a comparison for the going-concern value.122
c) Buy-Sell or Shareholder Agreement Valuation
Some courts have approved the use of buy-sell or shareholder agreements
to determine a value for the professional spouse’s goodwill.  A typical buy-sell
or partnership agreement provides a clause requiring the professional to sell
his or her holdings in the partnership back to the partnership upon withdrawal,
retirement, disability, or termination and provides an exact formula to value
the professional’s interest.   Many courts favor these agreements because123
they contain specific formulas limiting the goodwill available to the non-
professional spouse to the amount that could actually be realized by the
professional spouse, and valuation of goodwill based upon this method has
been praised for preventing “the ‘disturbing inequity in compelling a
professional practitioner to pay a spouse a share of intangible assets at a
judicially determined value that could not be realized by a sale.’”  124
Nevertheless, buy-sell agreements suffer from one substantial limitation: they
can only be used to value practices comprised of one or more professional; a
sole practitioner cannot have a buy-sell agreement with himself.
Even so, the use of buy-sell agreements varies between jurisdictions.  A
small number of courts, including the Oklahoma Supreme Court, have gone
117. Id.
118. Id. at 523.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 523-24.
121. Id. at 524.
122. Rosin, supra note 35, at 350.
123. White, supra note 31, at 527.  For an example of a buy-sell agreement, see infra text
accompanying notes 201-08.
124. White, supra note 31, at 528 (quoting Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981)).
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so far as to find that the presence of a buy-sell agreement is controlling on the
value of a professional’s goodwill even if the resulting value is zero.   Other125
courts view buy-sell agreements as establishing a presumptive value of
goodwill but allow the agreement to be challenged if the non-professional
spouse can prove the buy-sell agreement is not the true value of the
professional spouse’s interest.   Other courts use buy-sell agreements as only126
one factor in determining the presence of goodwill in a professional’s
practice.   Yet, many courts have concluded that buy-sell or partnership127
agreements are only useful to value goodwill when “they: (a) accurately
represent consistent transactions over time; (b) are entered into at arm’s length
without intent to deprive the nonprofessional spouse of marital property; (c)
are comprehensive and clear in their valuation formula; and (d) represent a
present day interest value.”128
Although buy-sell agreements provide a clear cut, non-speculative method
for valuing goodwill of professional partnerships, many arguments have
emerged against their use for valuation of goodwill in marital property
divisions.  The primary argument is that partnership agreements were not
designed to be used in this manner.   Rather, they were designed to129
discourage sale and govern the relationship between the professional and his
or her partners.   Such an agreement was not intended to divide property130
between spouses, change the property from community to individual, or
provide a share of the goodwill value to the non-professional spouse.  131
Therefore, while these agreements are pertinent for transactions within the
partnership, they are minimally relevant to divorce valuations.132
Another argument advanced against the use of buy-sell agreements reasons
that the professional spouse may be influenced by factors other than the fair
market value of the arrangement when entering into a partnership
125. Mocnik v. Mocnik, 1992 OK 99, ¶¶ 19-22, 838 P.2d 500, 505; see also White, supra
note 31, at 528 n.200.
126. White, supra note 31, at 528; see also Weaver v. Weaver, 324 S.E.2d 915, 917 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 368 S.E.2d 595, 599 (N.C. 1988); Stern v. Stern, 331
A.2d 257, 260-61 (N.J. 1975).
127. White, supra note 31, at 528-29; see also In re Marriage of Kells, 897 P.2d 1366, 1370
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); In re Marriage of Keyser, 820 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Colo. App. 1991); Poore
v. Poore, 331 S.E.2d 266, 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Butler v. Butler, 663 A.2d 148, 154-55
(Pa. 1995).
128. White, supra note 31, at 529 (footnote omitted).
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 530-31.
132. Id. at 531.
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agreement.   As a result, the partnership agreement may not reflect the true133
value of the professional spouse’s interest and will not be a true measure of
goodwill value.   Many opponents to this method of valuation also argue that134
partnership agreements result in the ability to rob and perpetrate a fraud on the
non-professional spouse by creating an easy path to remove goodwill from
marital property division.135
d) The Net Asset Value Approach
Under the asset approach, a business is valued “using one or more methods
based directly upon the value of a business’s tangible assets less liabilities,”
which is “analogous to the cost approach in real estate.”   Specifically, the136
net asset value method values a business by adjusting a business’s assets and
liabilities to their estimated fair market value or other standard of value.  137
The assets are adjusted to either their value in use for a going concern
business or to their liquidation value if the appraiser believes the business is
worth more defunct than operating.   The asset approach is usually utilized138
to value total businesses and is usually not used to value an operating business
considered a going concern.139
Accounts receivable, which are often the professional’s most valuable
asset, are properly adjusted to the projected realizable value of the accounts.  140
Other assets such as inventory, machinery, equipment, and real property are
increased or decreased in value to represent their fair market value as opposed
to the depreciated or cost value assigned to such assets on the books of the
company.   Notes receivable are adjusted to current value, and notes payable141
are adjusted to match current interest rates.   Finally, any deferred taxes due142
are generally not included as a liability unless the liability for such taxes is
“immediate and specific.”143
In Hertz v. Hertz, the Supreme Court of New Mexico specifically endorsed
the net asset value method, and noted that “‘[p]rofessional goodwill’ is
basically defined as the difference between the total value of the professional
association or corporation and the aggregate value of its separable resources
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. KLEEMAN, supra note 59, at 10.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 12-13.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 13.
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and property rights, less liabilities.”  The Hertz court gave a list of factors144
to be considered when determining professional goodwill, including “‘[t]he
length of time the professional has been practicing, his comparative success,
his age and health, and any past profits of the practice.  Attention should also
be given to the physical and fixed resources of the practice.’”   The court145
then noted that courts should not interpret its list of factors for determining
goodwill as a closed set because the valuation of goodwill in each case is a
fact specific determination.   Oklahoma has approved this method for146
valuation by implication for items such as stock,  and the possibility exists147
that this method could be a valid measure of goodwill in a law practice.148
e) The Income Valuation Method
The income valuation approach assesses a business “by determining the
present value of an expected benefit stream.”   Depending upon the type of149
business, expected benefits are usually represented by cash flow, earnings, or
dividends.   Conversion of those benefits into present value is most generally150
accomplished by capitalization or discounting techniques.   Capitalization151
generally applies if the appraiser believes the financial situation of the
business currently indicates future operations, and annual growth is expected
to occur at a constant rate over the next few years.   Discounting is used152
when the opposite occurs—that is, when the business’s current status does not
implicate future operations or growth; therefore, the most common use of
discounting occurs in start-up companies which are expected to incur losses
for their first few years.153
Most jurisdictions do not allow the use of this method when valuing assets
for marital property division because this approach takes into consideration
144. 657 P.2d 1169, 1173 (N.M. 1983).  While the court in Hertz specifically approved the
net asset value method, such method was not actually applied to reach a decision in the case,
as the court ruled that a buy-sell/shareholder agreement was controlling as to the value of a
professional spouse’s goodwill.  Id. at 1174.
145. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256, 259 (1980)).
146. Id.
147. Johnson v. Johnson, 1983 OK 117, ¶¶ 11-12, 674 P.2d 539, 543-44; King v. Sw.
Cotton Oil Co., 1978 OK CIV APP 19, ¶¶ 27-28, 585 P.2d 385, 389-90.
148. But see Mocnik v. Mocnik, 1992 OK 99, ¶ 21, 838 P.2d 500, 505 (“If goodwill is to
be divided as an asset, its value should be determined either by an agreement or by its fair
market value.”).
149. KLEEMAN, supra note 59, at 10.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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“postmarital efforts and investment by the spouse” retaining the business.  154
Since the purpose of division of marital property is to allocate the property
and debts accrued during the marriage, the income approach does not seem
viable for valuation of businesses for marital property divisions.  Oklahoma
has not specifically accepted or rejected this method of valuation.
III. Division of Marital Assets in Oklahoma
A. What Is Marital Property in Oklahoma, and Why Should It Include
Goodwill?
Every state provides for some form of property division upon divorce.  155
The most common method of property division is equitable division of marital
property.   In an equitable division of marital property, each spouse retains156
his or her separate property.   “Separate property” includes not only the157
property owned by a spouse before marriage which has not been commingled
with marital property  but also the separate property acquired by each spouse158
during the marriage.   Oklahoma defines “marital property” as that property159
which is “accumulated by the joint industry” of the spouses during the
marriage.   Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be jointly160
acquired, and the party seeking to establish property as separate property has
the burden of proof.   Even though the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined161
that a professional degree or license is the individual, indivisible property of
the holder,  the court subsequently found that a law practice can be162
154. Id. at 11.
155. Mary Jane Connell, Note, Property Division and Alimony Awards: A Survey of
Statutory Limitations on Judicial Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 433 (1981).
156. Id. at 436-37.
157. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121(B) (2001).  Oklahoma requires its courts to enter an order
“confirming in each spouse the property owned by him or her before marriage and the
undisposed-of property acquired after marriage by him or her in his or her own right.”  Id.  
158. See Standefer v. Standefer, 2001 OK 37, ¶¶ 16-18, 26 P.3d 104, 108-09 (comingled
personal injury settlement determined to be marital property because spouses’ separate tort
actions combined into one settlement); Umber v. Umber, 1979 OK 24, ¶¶ 10-12, 591 P.2d 299,
302 (pharmacy deemed marital property because parties combined separate property to purchase
it); see also 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121(B).
159. E.g., In re Estate of Hardaway, 1994 OK 30, ¶ 14, 872 P.2d 395, 399 (citing Perdue v.
Hartman, 1965 OK 177, ¶ 6, 408 P.2d 293, 296) (inheritances and gifts to individual marriage
partner); Manhart v. Manhart, 1986 OK 12, ¶¶ 18-40, 725 P.2d 1234, 1238-40 (conveyance
from one spouse to another can transform property from marital to separate).
160. Longmire v. Longmire, 1962 OK 219, ¶ 11, 376 P.2d 273, 275; see also Williams v.
Williams, 1967 OK 97, ¶¶ 18-20, 428 P.2d 218, 222.
161. Gray v. Gray, 1996 OK 84, ¶¶ 11-15, 922 P.2d 615, 619.
162. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 1979 OK 154, ¶ 13, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (determining professional
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considered jointly acquired property subject to property division in a
divorce.   163
Once property is determined to be separate or marital property, Oklahoma
provides that all marital property must be divided in a just and reasonable
manner.   In Oklahoma, “just and reasonable” means “equitable.”   Yet,164 165
achieving an equitable division in Oklahoma is not as easy as it would seem
because Oklahoma has not determined the meaning of the term “equitable”
with much clarity.  Therefore, most equitable divisions require the
consideration of many different factors and involve a number of value
judgments, most of which are left to the discretion of the trial judge.  A few
of the problems encountered when making equitable divisions of marital
property in Oklahoma are discussed below.
The first step in realizing an equitable property division requires the
understanding that equitable does not always mean equal.   In fact, the166
Oklahoma Supreme Court gave the following insight concerning equitable
divisions: “What constitutes an ‘equitable division’ of the parties’ jointly
acquired property . . . is to be determined from the circumstances surrounding
the acquisition of the property and the conduct of the parties with relation
thereto, and in making such determination a wide discretion is vested in the
trial court.”   Courts do not consider need an acceptable criterion on which167
to base a property division, and the extent of each party’s rights in property
depends upon “their respective conduct and efforts as the contributing factors”
in the creation and acquisition of the entire marital estate.   In fact, the court168
can and should consider the efforts of both parties during the marriage,
including such factors as frugality, economy, and industry.   If one party169
degree indivisible property of holder but spouse not prohibited from seeking award in lieu of
division of such property).
163. Ford v. Ford, 1988 OK 103, ¶ 3, 766 P.2d 950, 952.
164. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121(B) (2001).  The statute states in part:
As to such property, whether real or personal, which has been acquired by the
parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or both
of said parties, the court shall, subject to a valid antenuptial contract in writing,
make such division between the parties as may appear just and reasonable, by a
division of the property in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties,
and requiring the other thereof to be paid such sum as may be just and proper to
effect a fair and just division thereof.
Id.
165. Williams, ¶ 17, 428 P.2d at 222; McCoy v. McCoy, 1967 OK 86, ¶ 8, 429 P.2d 999,
1004. 
166. McCoy, ¶ 8, 429 P.2d at 1004. 
167. Id.
168. Bouma v. Bouma, 1968 OK 35, ¶ 8, 439 P.2d 198, 200.
169. Tobin v. Tobin, 1923 OK 164, ¶ 32, 213 P. 884, 889.
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spends much of the parties’ money in activities not conducive to the marriage
relationship or accumulation of marital property, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has said it would not be equitable to award such a spending, extravagant
party half the marital property.   Additionally, the court cannot award any170
marital property to the children of the parties.171
An added problem in the equitable division maze is the failure of the
Oklahoma statutory scheme to provide an exact—or even any—“formula for
distribution of the ‘net estate.’”   In fact, Oklahoma law does not even state172
explicitly whether courts should take into account debts in addition to assets
during marital property division.   Nonetheless, Oklahoma has long allowed173
trial judges to consider the net worth of property in an equitable property
division, to order one party to pay any debt, and to hold the other party
harmless for such debt.   For that reason, debt can drastically alter equitable174
division decisions, especially when combined with the equity factor when one
party has primarily incurred most of the debt.  Whatever the divorcing parties’
debt may be, the next logical step is valuing their assets to determine exactly
what their net estate holds, yet Oklahoma law is, once again, less than clear.
Oklahoma creates yet another fork in the road of equitable marital property
division by failing to provide guidance for determining exactly when courts
should value assets in the marital estate.  As discussed above, for property
divisions to be equitable, courts must value the marital property before it is
divided.   Oklahoma law does not set a definitive date upon which to value175
the marital assets, and trial judges are left with the discretion to fix the date
of valuation after due consideration of all of the circumstances.  176
Additionally, valuation dates may be different for each item of property at
issue.   Attorneys may argue for whichever date produces the most profitable177
results for their clients, ranging from the date of separation to the date of the
divorce decree or any date in between.  Once the trial judge sets the valuation
date, such date cannot be disturbed unless one party shows an abuse of
discretion.   Consequently, determining the property valuation date in178
170. Id.
171. Williams v. Williams, 1967 OK 97, ¶ 11, 428 P.2d 218, 221.
172. Teel v. Teel, 1988 OK 151, ¶ 6, 766 P.2d 994, 997.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 56-154 for a discussion of valuation methods.  The
selection of the proper valuation method for the marital property is another factor that must be
addressed when attempting to achieve an equitable division of marital property. 
176. Thielenhaus v. Thielenhaus, 1995 OK 5, ¶ 16, 890 P.2d 925, 933.
177. Id.
178. Lemons v. Lemons, 2006 OK CIV APP 5, ¶¶ 10-13, 128 P.3d 1113, 1115.
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Oklahoma is a key aspect to any marital property valuation and division
because it can translate into a larger or smaller award.
Finally, the most important task is to decide exactly how to equitably divide
the assets.  In Oklahoma, two primary approaches exist for achieving equitable
division of assets: (1) cash or kind property division, or (2) support awards,
usually called alimony.   While property division generally has no specific179
prerequisites other than holding of property or owing of debt, as an initial
requirement, an alimony award must be based on a demonstrated need180
which has some rational relationship to the marriage itself.   In determining181
the amount of alimony to award, the trial judge must consider the parties’
station in life, their conduct, “the earning capacity and estate of the [payor
spouse], and the financial means and physical condition of the [payee
spouse].”   The would-be payor spouse’s ability to pay is also a necessary182
consideration in determining alimony awards.   The listed factors do not183
exhaust the list of acceptable factors for consideration when awarding
alimony, and at one time, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals identified twenty-
one factors that could influence support alimony determinations.184
179. See supra note 164; see also 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121(B) (2001).  This statute states in
relevant part:
Either spouse may be allowed such alimony out of real and personal property of
the other as the court shall think reasonable, having due regard to the value of
such property at the time of the divorce.  Alimony may be allowed from real or
personal property, or both, or in the form of money judgment, payable either in
gross or in installments, as the court may deem just and equitable.
Id.
180. Johnson v. Johnson, 1983 OK 117, ¶ 23, 674 P.2d 539, 546.
181. Wood v. Wood, 1990 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 14, 793 P.2d 1372, 1376 (citing Dowdell v.
Dowdell, 1969 OK 155, 463 P.2d 948); Bowman v. Bowman, 1981 OK CIV APP 71, ¶ 29, 639
P.2d 1257, 1262, rev’d on other grounds, 657 P.2d 646, 651 (Okla. 1983).
182. Durland v. Durland, 1976 OK 102, ¶ 5, 552 P.2d 1148, 1149.
183. Jupe v. Jupe, 1947 OK 2, ¶ 13, 175 P.2d 976, 978; Wood, ¶ 14, 793 P.2d at 1376.
184. Bowman, ¶ 29 n.8, 639 P.2d at 1263 n.8.  The twenty-one factors include: (1) payee
spouse’s loss of inheritance rights; (2) expectation of future inheritance from the payor spouse;
(3) payor’s future earning capacity; (4) payor’s present ability to pay; (5) payee spouse’s
contribution to the payor spouse’s accumulation; (6) whether the marriage was one of affection
or convenience; (7) the payor’s earning capacity; (8) payee’s condition and means; (9) duration
of married life and ages of the parties; (10) payee’s health ; (11) any future increase in the value
of land; (12) the payee’s opportunity for employment; (13) the payee’s ability to obtain gainful
employment; (14) the mode of living to which the payee had become accustomed during the
marriage; (15) the probability of the payor’s ability to progress financially; (16) the earning
capacity of the payee; (17) the payee’s ability to make a living before the marriage; (18) the
conduct of the parties; (19) the payee’s education; (20) the age of the children and the need to
maintain a home for them; and (21) the parties’ station in life before the divorce.  Id.
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Courts use many combinations of property division and support awards to
reach an equitable division of assets, such as when one party is awarded both
property division and support or when one party is awarded property and the
other party support.  Additionally, the trial judge has the discretion to award
a hybrid type of property division and support called property-division
alimony or property division in lieu of alimony.   With property-division185
alimony, the trial judge awards one spouse most of the property and awards
off-setting property division alimony to the other.   Property-division186
alimony cannot be modified for any reason and does not terminate upon
death.   Further, since it is not pure support alimony, property-division187
alimony is not tax deductible.   With all its restrictions, property-division188
alimony seems to be merely the division of property on a cash based
installment plan.  Since a divorce is an equitable proceeding, the trial judge’s
division of the marital estate is given great deference, and “[t]he reviewing
court will not disturb the division absent some abuse of discretion or a finding
that the nisi prius decision is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.”189
Of all of the numerous and tedious decisions that are involved in the
process of equitable division, the choice of the proper vehicle to effect such
division, i.e., alimony, property division, or a hybrid of the two, outweighs all
other decisions because such choice can create a drastic cost or benefit to one
party in terms of dollars and cents expended. This is so because Oklahoma
courts treat alimony and property division differently when faced with
modification based on changed circumstances.  Oklahoma law provides that
“[p]ayments pertaining to a division of property are irrevocable and not
subject to subsequent modification by the court making the award.”   Yet,190
payments of support alimony may be modified if the parties experience a
change in circumstances sufficient to change the equity of the original
award.   Circumstances that support modification or termination of alimony191
185. Record v. Record, 1991 OK 85, ¶¶ 2, 14-18, 816 P.2d 1139, 1141-43.
186. Isenhower v. Isenhower, 1983 OK CIV APP 12, ¶¶ 8, 666 P.2d 238, 240.
187. Id. ¶¶ 8-16, 666 P.2d at 238-42.
188. 26 U.S.C. § 215 (2006).
189. Teel v. Teel, 1988 OK 151, ¶ 7, 766 P.2d 994, 998 (footnote omitted).
190. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(A) (2001).
191. Id. § 134(D).  The subsection provides in part:
[T]he provisions of any divorce decree pertaining to the payment of alimony as
support may be modified upon proof of changed circumstances relating to the
need for support or ability to support which are substantial and continuing so as
to make the terms of the decree unreasonable to either party. Modification by the
court of any divorce decree pertaining to the payment of alimony as support,
pursuant to the provisions of this subsection, may extend to the terms of the
payments and to the total amount awarded; provided however, such modification
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awards include remarriage of the payee spouse,  cohabitation of the payee192
spouse,  and financial change of circumstances,  yet modification is only193 194
allowed for future payments.   Last, the tax implications arising from the195
division of the marital estate can have extraordinary financial effects on the
parties especially as alimony, unlike property division is income to the payee
and a deduction from the gross income of the payor.196
Modification of support awards is especially important to the business
professional who knows that financial certainty may not exist.  As unpleasant
as it may be to consider, businesses fail, and people lose their jobs.  Many law
practices hinge on income and needs that rest on probabilities, and, as such,
many sole legal practitioners do not have the financial guarantee they sought
when they opened their practice.  If goodwill is divided as marital property in
Oklahoma, the amount of the award is permanent regardless of the
fluctuations of the professional’s business or even business failure.   Yet,197
support alimony can be prospectively modified if the professional experiences
either an upturn or downturn in their business upon “proof of changed
circumstances relating to the need for support or ability to support which are
substantial and continuing so as to make the terms of the decree unreasonable
to either party.”   Therefore, support alimony in lieu of the division of a198
professional’s goodwill as part of a property settlement provides a more
flexible basis to deal with the changing financial positions of the parties and
helps to ensure that the overall divorce settlements are equitable.
Despite the fairness rationale for the greater use of support awards,
Oklahoma has found that goodwill sometimes constitutes divisible marital
property in professions other than law based upon the manner in which the
professional spouse holds his or her interest in the profession.   This199
professional goodwill can also be used as a basis for determining support
alimony.   In Mocnik v. Mocnik, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a200
shall only have prospective application.
Id.
192. Id. § 134(B); Mathis v. Mathis, 2004 OK CIV APP 32, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d 662, 664.
193. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(C); Smith v. Smith, 1992 OK CIV APP 132, ¶¶ 7-8, 849 P.2d
1097, 1098.
194. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(D).
195. Thielenhaus v. Thielenhaus, 1999 OK CIV APP 7, ¶¶ 5, 7, 978 P.2d 369, 370-71.
196. 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (2006).
197. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(A).
198. Id. § 134(D).
199. Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1995 OK 22, ¶¶ 12-13, 891 P.2d 1277, 1280, superceded by statute
on other grounds as stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29; Mocnik v. Mocnik,
1992 OK 99, ¶¶ 21-22, 838 P.2d 500, 505.
200. Mocnik, ¶ 13, 838 P.2d at 504.
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radiologist’s goodwill in the professional radiology corporation he held under
a partnership agreement with other radiologists should not be divisible marital
property.   There, the couple was already married when the husband attended201
medical school and completed his residency in radiology.   The husband then202
entered the practice of radiology with the Tulsa Radiology Associates and
practiced with such group until his divorce.203
The trial court separately valued the husband’s interest in the professional
corporation based upon the value of his stock, his part of the accounts
receivable due under the non-competition agreement with the other doctors,
and his goodwill.   The trial court determined the value of the husband’s204
goodwill based upon the capitalized excess earnings method.   The Supreme205
Court reversed the trial court because the husband was required by the
partnership agreement to sell his stock back to the corporation should he
terminate his employment.   As a result, he could not realize his share of the206
corporation’s goodwill except by continued practice with the corporation,
especially since the partnership agreement set a specific sale price for each
share of stock should it be sold back to the corporation.   Thus, the207
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision indicates that if a professional cannot
realize his goodwill in a partnership except through continued practice with
the partnership, the professional does not actually have any goodwill to divide
as a marital asset.
Conversely, in Traczyk v. Traczyk, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
a doctor’s goodwill in a sole proprietorship does constitute marital property.  208
In Traczyk, the husband was a doctor of podiatric medicine in his wholly
owned and operated professional corporation.   His wife was a part-time209
registered nurse, but it is unclear from the record if she worked with the
husband at his corporation.   The trial court ruled—and the Oklahoma210
Supreme Court agreed—that the goodwill value of the husband’s medical
practice should be properly included in the marital property division because,
as a sole proprietorship, the husband’s practice was readily transferable.  211
201. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 22, 838 P.2d at 504-05.
202. Id. ¶ 2, 838 P.2d at 501.
203. Id.
204. Id. ¶ 4, 838 P.2d at 502.
205. Id. ¶ 11, 838 P.2d at 504.
206. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 838 P.2d at 504-05.
207. Id.
208. 1995 OK 22, ¶ 2, 891 P.2d 1277, 1278, superceded by statute on other grounds as
stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29. 
209. Id. ¶ 3, 891 P.2d at 1278.
210. Id.
211. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 891 P.2d at 1280.
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Because the sale of the husband’s practice was not restricted like the
partnership in Mocnik,  a real value could actually be placed upon its212
goodwill by determining what percentage of the husband’s patients might stay
with the clinic if the husband left his practice.   The court also found it213
proper to include the practice’s goodwill in the marital property division
because the reputation of the husband’s podiatry clinic was distinct from that
of the husband.   In explaining its rationale for this finding, the court gave214
some guidance for future courts to use to determine whether goodwill is
personal to the professional:
The goodwill of the [clinic] is distinct from the personal reputation
of Dr. Traczyk.  Although many of Dr. Traczyk’s patients would
not continue to patronize the [clinic] were Dr. Traczyk to sell to
another podiatrist, competent evidence indicates that many would
stay.  Indeed, Dr. Traczyk may use the goodwill as a selling point
to potential purchasers.215
The court then goes on to reject the theory urged by Dr. Traczyk based upon
two cases discussed in the Travis decision that a double award would occur
by allowing his spouse to receive both support alimony and a division of the
goodwill of his podiatry practice.   The court indicated that no double award216
would occur in this instance because Dr. Traczyk’s professional practice had
transferable goodwill, which was a separate and distinct asset subject to
division.  217
Two main arguments exist for including professional goodwill in the
marital property division of divorcing couples.  One of the most prominent is
drawn from the partnership theory of marriage, reasoning that because
goodwill is the result of a marital partnership, it should be divided between
both the professional and the non-professional spouse.   Under this theory,218
“a nonprofessional spouse is similar to a silent partner in the professional
spouse’s practice, indirectly contributing to the business” by providing
personal services that enable the professional spouse to pursue career
opportunities.   Since the non-professional spouse has contributed to the219
212. Mocnik, ¶¶ 17-18, 838 P.2d at 504. 
213. Traczyk, ¶¶ 11-19, 891 P.2d at 1280.
214. Id. ¶ 14, 891 P.2d at 1280.
215. Id.
216. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 891 P.2d at 1281; see infra text accompanying notes 230-32, 243-46.
217. Traczyk, ¶ 21, 829 P.2d at 1281. 
218. Carmen Valle Patel, Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in
Equitable Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 572-73 (1983).
219. Id.
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professional spouse’s attainment of an enhanced professional, financial, and
social status, the non-professional spouse should have a right to the assets of
the professional spouse he or she helped to create.   Another argument for220
including professional goodwill as marital property is to compensate the non-
professional spouse for opportunities lost.   While this theory closely221
resembles the partnership theory, it assumes that the non-professional spouse
has foregone opportunities in order to allow the professional spouse to pursue
or advance in a career.222
Nonetheless, multiple contrary arguments exist.  First, goodwill should not
exist to the extent that it is inalienable and illiquid.   This concern is223
particularly relevant for the legal profession because a developer of goodwill
cannot cash out his or her goodwill in the market—usually because no market
exists.   Further, to sell his or her goodwill, a lawyer under the revised Rule224
1.17 must cease to engage in the practice of law in his or her old geographic
area.   For many lawyers, this is not a viable option because they need to225
continue to earn a living post-divorce and may not desire to abandon their
established office and move to a different geographic area and start anew.  A
second concern with valuing and dividing goodwill is that all valuation
methods inherently include future earnings.   While the future earnings of a226
professional may be used to set a support award, generally they are not
divisible marital property.   This argument is very powerful because in227
valuing and dividing a professional practice’s goodwill, the professional
spouse is not expected to sell the practice to provide the non-professional
spouse with a share of it.   Instead, recovery is based upon anticipation that228
the professional spouse will continue to practice and recoup the value
allocated to the goodwill from future earnings.229
Other sources have articulated additional arguments against including
goodwill in marital property divisions.  If the professional spouse’s goodwill
is valued and divided as marital property, and the non-professional spouse is
220. Id.
221. Michael G. Heyman, Goodwill & the Ideal Equality: Marital Property at the
Crossroads, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 16 (1992-1993).
222. Id.
223. Blumberg, supra note 33, at 234.
224. Id. (discussing the increased relevance of inalienability and illiquidity for those whose
goodwill is inseparable from a particular person).
225. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); see supra note 7 (full text of
amended Rule 1.17).
226. Blumberg, supra note 33, at 233.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/4
2008] COMMENT 615
also awarded support payments based upon the professional spouse’s
projected earnings, the non-professional spouse receives, in essence, a double
award.   This double award occurs because the non-professional spouse230
receives a payout of his or her portion of the professional spouse’s goodwill,
the value of which has been determined by the professional spouse’s projected
earnings.  The same projected earnings, of which the professional spouse has
just paid a portion in a property settlement, will again be used to set support
payments.   In essence, the non-professional spouse gets a portion of the231
projected earnings through goodwill and another portion through the support
award, resulting in an inequitable double award.  Critics have also argued that
goodwill should not be recognized if it is not marketable because
unmarketable goodwill produces the potential for overvaluation and abuse.  232
Any value in a professional business in excess of the market price is personal
to the professional spouse and will disappear when the specific professional
departs the business; thus, goodwill truly does not exist in professional
settings because it follows the professional, not the business.   Whether the233
proponents or opponents of including professional goodwill as marital
property win in the theoretical realm, Oklahoma has already decided the issue
for attorneys in Oklahoma.
B. An Attorney’s Goodwill Is Not Marital Property in Oklahoma—Travis
Revisited
In 1990, in Travis v. Travis, the Oklahoma Supreme Court first entertained
whether the goodwill accumulated by an attorney in his sole practice should
be valued and divided as a marital asset in a divorce.   Rex Travis testified234
that he was a sole practitioner who worked primarily on a contingent fee basis
on plaintiffs’ personal injury cases referred to him by other attorneys.   His235
office furnishings were worth about $40,000.00, but his business was in debt
by $415,000.00.   Rex and his expert testified that the value of his practice236
was only the value of his office furnishings, while his wife and her expert
testified that the practice was worth $750,000.00 based upon Rex’s projected
future earnings.   The trial court agreed with Rex that the value of his237
230. Id. at 236; see infra text accompanying notes 243-46; see also supra text accompanying
note 216.
231. Blumberg, supra note 33, at 236.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 237.
234. 1990 OK 57, 795 P.2d 96.
235. Id. ¶ 3, 795 P.2d at 96.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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practice existed only in himself and the furnishings.   His wife appealed the238
ruling.   The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held239
that Rex Travis had no goodwill in his law practice for the purposes of
dividing the marital estate.240
In determining whether to include goodwill in the value of a lawyer’s
practice, the Oklahoma Supreme Court surveyed the treatment of attorney
goodwill as a marital asset in other states and found a virtually even split.  241
At the time of the Travis decision, seven states refused to recognize an
attorney’s goodwill for marital property division, while nine states did
recognize such goodwill.   The court then considered factors of equity242
discussed by the Wisconsin and Pennsylvania courts when they were
confronted with the same issue.   The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in243
Holbrook v. Holbrook stated, “There is a disturbing inequity in compelling a
professional practitioner to pay a spouse a share of intangible assets at a
judicially determined value that could not be realized by a sale or another
method of liquidating value.”   The Wisconsin court concluded that244
awarding alimony plus half of a practitioner’s goodwill would constitute
double recovery because the goodwill was included in the practitioner’s
238. Id.
239. Id. ¶ 1, 795 P.2d at 96.
240. Id. ¶ 13, 795 P.2d at 100.
241. Id. ¶ 4, 795 P.2d at 97.
242. The following states recognized goodwill for the purpose of property division at the
time of the Travis decision: Arizona, Molloy v. Molloy, 761 P.2d 138 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
(professional corporation); California, In re Marriage of Green, 261 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (sole practitioner); Delaware, E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688 (Del. 1983) (sole
practitioner); Illinois, In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(partnership); New Jersey, Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1983) (exclusively-owned
professional corporation); New Mexico, Hertz v. Hertz, 657 P.2d 1169 (N.M. 1983)
(professional corporation); New York, Stolowitz v. Stolowitz, 435 N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) (law firm); North Carolina, McLean v. McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376 (N.C. 1988)
(professional association); and Washington, In re Marriage of Brooks, 756 P.2d 161 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1988) (partnership).  The following states refused to recognize good will for the purpose
of division at the time of the Travis decision: Alaska, Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211
(Alaska 1989) (sole shareholder of a professional corporation); Florida, Thompson v.
Thompson, 546 So. 2d 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (professional association); Maryland,
Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833 (Md. 1988) (sole practitioner); Pennsylvania, Beasley v.
Beasley, 518 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. 1986) (sole proprietorship employing fourteen to fifteen
additional attorneys); Tennessee, Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985)
(partnership); Texas, Hirsch v. Hirsch, 770 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App. 1989) (professional
corporation); and Wisconsin, Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)
(partnership).
243. Travis, ¶¶ 6-7, 795 P.2d at 99.
244. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 351.
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salary, which was used to determine the alimony award.   Thus, the court did245
not allow the goodwill of an attorney to be divided as marital property.246
Similarly, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Beasley v. Beasley
concluded that goodwill was not an asset for marital property division
purposes under Pennsylvania law, finding that double recovery would occur
as follows:
To assess a value on future productivity and to award a
proportionate amount to the spouse is akin to making a lump sum
alimony payment since it is based on future earnings of the paying
spouse.  If, in addition to this payment, alimony is awarded, there
is, in effect, a double charge on the future income of the paying
spouse.247
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also relied heavily upon a Maryland case
styled Prahinski v. Prahinski  in making its decision.   In Prahinski, the248 249
lawyer husband was a sole practitioner, and his practice was almost
exclusively devoted to real estate settlements.   The trial court observed that250
if Mr. Prahinski were to terminate his employment, “the lights would go out,”
and his practice would cease to exist.   Thus, the court concluded that251
Prahinski’s goodwill was not true goodwill because it depended entirely upon
his reputation as a lawyer and, thus, could not be an independent asset of the
Prahinski law practice.   Therefore, any valuation of Prahinski’s goodwill252
would actually be a calculation of his future earnings, which was allowable
only as a proper consideration for alimony, not marital property division.  253
Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that
for professional goodwill to be marital property it must be a
business asset having a value independent of the continued
presence or reputation of any particular individual.  “That is, it
must be shown to be an asset distinct from, and thus not dependant 
245. Id. at 352.
246. Id.
247. Beasley, 518 A.2d at 553.
248. 540 A.2d 833 (Md. 1988).
249. Travis v. Travis, 1990 OK 57, ¶¶ 9-10, 795 P.2d 96, 99-100.
250. 540 A.2d 833.
251. Id. at 843.
252. Id. at 843-44.
253. Id.
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on, the reputation or continued presence of the individual
professional.”254
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, while not specifically adopting the
reasoning of either the Wisconsin or Pennsylvania courts, ruled consistently
with their holdings.   Further, the court seemed to specifically adopt the255
rationale of the Prahinski court  and later endorsed this adoption.   While256 257
it appears at first glance that Prahinski had the same equity and double award
rationales as the Wisconsin and Pennsylvania cases discussed by the court, the
main rationale for the Prahinski decision was that for goodwill to be a
divisible marital asset, it must have a value independent of the continued
presence or reputation of the individual professional—i.e., the goodwill must
not be personal.   The court further found that support awards, unlike one-258
time goodwill divisions, presented a more equitable vehicle for marital
property division because they could be adjusted over time to fit the sole
practitioner’s circumstances.259
The Prahinski court reasoned that this was a better scheme because it was
much less speculative to determine future earning capacity for support awards
than to establish the goodwill value of law practice.   Like the court in260
Prahinski, the Oklahoma Supreme Court also held that goodwill of a sole
practicing lawyer was personal goodwill by stating “the reputation of the
lawyer cannot be purchased by another seeking to acquire an established law
practice.”   The court further reasoned that an attorney’s goodwill should not261
be divisible because Rex Travis could not ethically sell his law practice even
he if so desired.   For these reasons, the court held that the goodwill of a sole262
practicing attorney should not be valued and divided as a marital asset in a
divorce proceeding.   Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court went so far as263
to hold that Rex Travis had no goodwill in his law practice.264
254. Travis, ¶ 9, 795 P.2d at 99 (quoting Prahinski, 540 A.2d at 843).
255. Id. ¶ 12, 795 P.2d at 100.
256. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 795 P.2d at 100.
257. Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1995 OK 22, ¶¶ 9-10, 891 P.2d 1277, 1279-80, superceded by
statute on other grounds as stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29.
258. Travis, ¶¶ 6-10, 795 P.2d at 98-100.
259. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 795 P.2d at 100.
260. Id.
261. Id. ¶ 11, 795 P.2d at 100.
262. Id.
263. Id. ¶ 13, 795 P.2d at 100.
264. Id.
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IV. Rule 1.17’s Impact on the Division of Law Practice Goodwill in
Divorces
A. What Is New, and Why Does It Matter?
Under Oklahoma’s revised Rule of Professional Conduct 1.17, an attorney
may now sell the goodwill of his or her law practice along with the other
assets of the practice.   Rule 1.17’s specific acknowledgment that goodwill265
exists in the practice of law, coupled with the authorization to sell such
goodwill, has opened the door for a careful revisiting of the Travis decision. 
Deferring to the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Travis definition of an attorney’s
goodwill as personal, the pre-2008 Rule 1.17 did not allow or even mention
the sale of goodwill because at that time, in accordance with Travis, a lawyer
had no goodwill.   While the old Rule 1.17 did not explicitly say that266
goodwill could not be sold,  no necessity existed to do so because Travis had267
already established that Rex Travis had “no” goodwill to sell because as a
lawyer, the personal goodwill he had in his reputation could not be
purchased.268
A long-standing tenet of statutory construction is that any common law rule
is not changed by the passage of a statute unless the statute specifically speaks
to the common law rule.   In fact, Oklahoma specifically provides,269
By statutory mandate the common law remains in full force in this
state, unless a statute explicitly provides to the contrary. 
Oklahoma law does not permit legislative abrogation of the
common law by implication; rather, its alteration must be clearly
and plainly expressed.  An intent to change the common law will
265. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
266. Travis, ¶¶ 11-13, 795 P.2d at 100.
267. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008); see supra note 13
(full text of Rule 1.17 prior to the 2008 amendment).
268. Travis, ¶¶ 11-13, 795 P.2d at 100.
269. Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 11, 833 P.2d 1218, 1225-26.  But see 12
OKLA. STAT. § 2 (2001).  Section 2 states as follows:
The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial
decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid
of the general statutes of Oklahoma; but the rule of the common law, that statutes
in derogation thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any
general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to
promote their object.
Id.
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not be presumed from an ambiguous, doubtful or inconclusive text. 
A presumption favors the preservation of common-law rights.270
Thus, since the pre-2008 Rule 1.17 did not speak specifically to the definition
or existence of an attorney’s goodwill in opposition to Travis, the ruling in
Travis was not disturbed.  Yet, the mere mention of goodwill as saleable by
the revised 2008 Rule 1.17 creates a strong argument that attorney goodwill
is no longer personal.  If the legislature did not intend to change Travis’s
holding, it presumably would not have made goodwill saleable.
As a result, the potential exists for the revised Rule 1.17 to tremendously
upset the definition of an attorney’s professional goodwill, which legal
practitioners in Oklahoma have relied upon for the last nineteen years.  In an
instant, the inclusion of the words “including goodwill” in the revised statute
allowing the sale of a law practice transformed an attorney’s personal
goodwill in his or her law practice into enterprise goodwill in the practice
itself.   The statutory language seems to virtually amend the operative271
language in the Travis decision as if to say a lawyer’s goodwill is saleable and
transferable with the practice.  By implication, the personal nature of an
attorney’s practice and skill set is instantly dissolved, and an attorney is now
worth no more than an office fixture or good location to his or her law
practice.  Such a change shakes the divorcing attorney’s world.  If an asset is
saleable, transferable, and implicit in the business to which it inheres, it can
be valued and divided in a divorce proceeding as a marital asset just like the
podiatry practice in Traczyk.   The attorney’s once distinct and personal272
goodwill becomes just another asset of the marital estate, just like the
attorney’s office furniture; and once it has become an asset of the marriage,
no reason exists not to divide it with the non-professional spouse.273
270. Tate, ¶ 11, 833 P.2d at 1225-26 (footnotes omitted).
271. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); see supra note 7 (full text of
amended Rule 1.17).
272. See Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1990 OK 22,¶ 21, 891 P.2d 1277, 1281, superceded by statute
on other grounds as stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29; see also supra notes
208-17.  For further support of this author’s conclusion, see ROBERT G. SPECTOR, OKLAHOMA
FAMILY LAW: THE HANDBOOK 2007-2008, at 128-31 (2008), which was published after the
author submitted this Comment for publication but became available before final publication
of this Comment.  Professor Robert Spector concludes Travis is likely no longer good law “to
the extent the practitioner can include the goodwill value as part of the sale price of the
practice.”  Id. at 131. 
273. Traczyk, ¶¶ 20-22, 891 P.2d at 1281 (“Husband further argues that by both allowing
goodwill to be divided as marital property and awarding support alimony the trial court has
charged him twice for his future income. . . .  He asserts two cases cited in Travis resolve the
issue of ‘double dipping’ into his future income.  However, we find these cases, Holbrook v.
Holbrook, and Beasley v. Beasley, unpersuasive because, as Travis indicates, they both
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The forced covenant not to compete is another vital change to the old rule. 
In the pre-2008 version, a lawyer wishing to sell his or her practice had to
cease the private practice of law in Oklahoma completely.   The revised rule,274
by allowing a lawyer to sell his or her practice or practice area as long as the
attorney “ceases to engage in the private practice of law . . . in the geographic
area in Oklahoma in which the practice has been conducted,”  creates more275
of an express ethical covenant not compete with the purchasing attorney rather
than an outright bar on practicing in Oklahoma.  Selling attorneys need only
cease the private practice of law in their old geographic area, not the entire
state of Oklahoma.   Herein lies another argument that Travis is no longer276
good law because an attorney could plausibly sell his or her practice to
liquidate the goodwill for division without destroying his or her livelihood,
especially since the attorney could just move and set up a new practice in a
nearby town still in Oklahoma.  As such, the express ethical covenant not to
compete, which allows an attorney to sell his or her practice and then set up
shop in another geographical area in Oklahoma, drives one more nail into the
rationale and decision in Travis based upon the non-saleability of a law
practice and its goodwill.
Another key change to Rule 1.17 is the allowance of “practice area”
sales.   Under the pre-2008 Rule 1.17, attorneys were only permitted to sell277
their entire practice.   The new rule allows attorneys to sell only a part of278
their practice, and the part of the practice sold can be very specific.  The
Comment section to Rule 1.17 explains this distinction: 
[A] lawyer with a substantial number of estate planning matters
and a substantial number of probate administration cases may sell
the estate planning portion of the practice but remain in the
practice of law by concentrating on probate administration;
concerned the goodwill of law practices where such goodwill was related to the reputation of
the lawyer.  In other words, Holbrook and Beasley are distinguishable because they did not
involve a professional practice with transferable goodwill as the case at bar did. . . .  This
goodwill was part of the property which should be divided between the parties; Wife has a right
to receive her share of the property.” (citations omitted) (citing 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121 (1991)).
274. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008); see supra note 13
(full text of Rule 1.17 prior to the 2008 amendment).
275. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17(a) (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
276. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); see supra note 7 (full text of
amended Rule 1.17).
277. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); see supra note 7 (full text of
amended Rule 1.17).
278. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008); see supra note 13
(full text of Rule 1.17 prior to the 2008 amendment).
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however, that practitioner may not thereafter accept any estate
planning matters.279
While another comment to this section explains that practice area sales were
instituted as a mechanism to protect clients with less lucrative matters,  an280
application of the above comment distinguishing practice areas seems to
negate, or at least greatly lessen, this protection.  Considering the example
given in the comment distinguishing estate planning and administration as
different areas of practice, circumvention of this rule would seem rather easy
as the definition of practice areas could be as simple as creating practice areas
from different aspects of the same process.  For instance, an attorney could
sell his or her practice area of obtaining divorces but retain his or her divorce
modification practice.  
With the liberal interpretation of “practice area” given under the above
example, practice area sales could be a relatively easy undertaking.  While it
may be argued that the comment requires the practitioner to have “a
substantial number” of cases in a practice area,  what is substantial to a281
general practitioner who has five or six cases each in ten or fifteen areas of
law?  No guidance is given by the rule, and a good argument could be made
that five or six cases is “a substantial number” to a general practitioner. 
Consequently, practice area sales could create an easy way to liquidate
goodwill and further seal the fate of Travis as defunct.
Some changes have been made to Rule 1.17 that may save Travis, as they
may affect the validity of the new rule and even require its repeal or revision. 
The prior rule’s protection of attorney-client confidentiality has been removed
from the new Rule 1.17.  The old rule required that no attorney-client
communications protected under other rules be revealed to the purchaser until
the client consented to the transfer of his or her file and also required
sequestration of the file until such consent was obtained.   This deletion may282
affect the validity of the new rule, especially considering the removal of the
requirement to segregate the files of clients who cannot be contacted to obtain
279. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 cmt. 5 (Supp. 2008).
280. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 cmt. 6 (Supp. 2008).  The comment states
in part:
The Rule requires that the seller’s entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be
sold.  The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice area protects
those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to
secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating
matters.
Id.
281. See supra text accompanying note 279.
282. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/4
2008] COMMENT 623
their consent.  While the new rule allows courts to enter orders approving the
transfer of a file without a client’s consent if the client cannot be contacted,
the old rule protected the attorney-client privilege more by requiring actual
consent before transfer.   Given this change, a situation could arise whereby283
a client who was not contacted regarding a sale and whose file was then
judicially transferred to another attorney could file suit against the transferring
attorney for breach of client confidentiality and indirectly challenge Rule
1.17’s revised treatment of confidential client material.
The attorney-client privilege is the client’s privilege to waive.   It is hard284
to envision a court deciding to involuntarily transfer representation of a client
to another attorney in a for-profit sale of a law practice without obtaining the
client’s informed consent.  Further, by specifically removing the prohibition
against discussing case specifics with the purchaser without client consent, the
new rule implies that the selling attorney may discuss such matters with the
potential purchaser.  Such a discussion would clearly violate other ethical
rules and potentially subject an attorney to a malpractice action.285
Additional changes were made to Rule 1.17 that, while valid, are unwise in
the protection of a client’s best interests.  While these changes are not
particularly helpful in a re-analysis of the Travis decision, they are briefly
described below in the interest of completeness.  The provision that required
fees not to be increased solely due to the sale has been removed from the new
version of Rule 1.17.  As with the old rule, the purchaser of the law practice
can refuse to undertake the representation of a client who refuses to pay him
or her at a rate the purchaser usually charges for the service.   This286
requirement seems to operate as an end run around the requisite sale of the
entire practice or practice area, which according to the comment to Rule 1.17
was designed to protect those clients whose matters were less lucrative from
being excluded from the sale.   A purchasing attorney could potentially raise287
his or her price for the services rendered on less lucrative cases, and if the
client could not pay the higher price, the client could effectively be removed
from the sale by the exception authorizing discretionary fee changes.  Actions
of this nature are clearly against the spirit of the rule.
In the end, the revised Rule 1.17 may be the death knell for Travis.  While
Rule 1.17’s tenets may help lawyers in the relatively uncommon ordeal of
283. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.17 (2001) (amended 2008).
284. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT SCOPE, 5 OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, app. 3-A, Scope (Supp.
2008).
285. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001).
286. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
287. Id. R. 1.17 cmt. 6.
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disposing of their practice, it may drastically alter the fate of sole practitioners
and small partnerships at the time of divorce—a situation all too common and
much more likely to affect the lives of lawyers on a day-to-day basis. 
Nonetheless, all may not be as bleak as it seems for the personal classification
of attorney goodwill under the Travis scheme.  Strict construction of the new
Rule 1.17 and the continuing rationale for the decision in Travis could
potentially save lawyers across the state from the confusion and financial
hardship that would be forced upon them by the division of their law practice
goodwill.
B. Strict Construction—The Potential Saving Grace for Travis
A strict construction of the 2008 Oklahoma Rule of Professional Conduct
1.17 can save Travis.  A reviewing court could realistically construe Rule 1.17
as not changing the substantive law in Travis but rather providing for the sale
of goodwill if any ever accrues to a partnership or sole practitioner.  In fact,
since the 2008 version of Rule 1.17 does not specifically say an attorney’s
goodwill inheres to the business and is no longer personal, it may not even
address the rule in Travis.  While the implication may be that an attorney’s
goodwill is saleable and attached to the business, revised Rule 1.17 does not
expressly say so, and to change a common law rule, a statute must speak
directly to the common law.   In fact, Oklahoma’s presumption favoring288
common law rights states that a common law rule cannot be changed by
implication.   Nonetheless, should this argument fail, Rule 1.17’s own289
restrictions should prevent Travis from being overturned.
While a lawyer under the new Rule 1.17 can ethically sell his or her law
practice, the restrictions within the rule itself effectively prohibit the lawyer
from selling the practice incident to a divorce.  For a private attorney to cash
out his or her interest in a law practice in order to pay a spouse a portion of the
practice’s goodwill, the attorney must cease the practice of law in Oklahoma
or in the geographic area in which he or she currently practices.   This290
restriction is substantial in the context of awarding a property settlement to the
non-professional spouse based upon goodwill.  Moving or ending the law
practice would effectively end the lawyer’s ability to generate income from
his goodwill in order to pay his or her spouse a share of goodwill; after all, the
lawyer can no longer practice as before.  Requiring a practitioner to cease the
practice of law would defeat the entire rationale for allowing goodwill to be
288. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (2001); Brown v. Founders Bank and Trust Co., Okla., 1994 OK
130, ¶ 15, 890 P.2d 855, 863; Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, ¶ 11, 833 P.2d 1218,
1225-26.
289. Tate, ¶ 11, 833 P.2d at 1225-26.
290. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
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divided in a divorce, which is to continue to gain income from the accrued
goodwill that would allow the non-professional spouse to recoup his or her
share.  Additionally, forcing the professional spouse to cash out and move his
or her practice to another area could impair the relationship with the parties’
children as well as place a significant barrier to the professional’s fight for
custody.
While critics could say the rule technically could allow goodwill to be
liquidated because the practitioner could sell her or his practice and move to
another location in the state, requiring attorneys to do this seems unreasonable
and unrealistic, especially when the purpose of a divorce settlement is to
produce an equitable division of assets.   Requiring the professional spouse291
to move either out of state or out of his or her practicing locale would
effectively terminate the professional’s ability to recoup goodwill because he
or she would effectively have to start a new practice without the ability to gain
from his or her old goodwill.
Proponents for overturning Travis could also find support for the ability of
an attorney to liquidate the goodwill in the practice by embracing a loose or
liberal construction of Rule 1.17’s authorization of “practice area” sales.  292
Yet if the spirit of Rule 1.17 is followed, the sale of a practice area generally
will not allow a practitioner a real opportunity for a cash out of goodwill.  For
those solo attorneys who specialize in one or two areas of law, a “practice
area” sale could be the equivalent of a full sale of the practice and the loss of
the ability to produce future income in the profession.
The same result ensues for the general practitioner, although it may stem
from a different rationale; a general practitioner may not have enough cases
in a single area to sell for a profit.  It is common for attorneys to work as
general practitioners who make their living taking in whatever clients come
through the door.  These general practitioners could practice in as many as
twenty areas of law.  Therefore, the sale of one area of a general practice
might not generate much revenue.  Of course, the goodwill general
practitioners accumulate arises from their repeat business,  but such goodwill293
works differently for general practitioners because clients in one field may
come back for legal assistance in another.  For example, a client who comes
in initially for a divorce returns for a will, then for her mother’s probate, and
then for her son’s DUI.  Forcing a “practice area” sale could destroy the
ability of a general practitioner to accept that returning client.  Even if a
general practitioner could realize enough gain to justify selling a single
291. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 121(B) (2001).
292. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008); see supra notes 277-82 and
accompanying text.
293. Freeling v. Wood, 1961 OK 113, ¶ 12, 361 P.2d 1061, 1063.
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practice area, the general practitioner could severely injure his or her own
practice by restricting the ability to take in clients.  Once the practice was
injured, the sole practitioner could not as easily recoup the lost goodwill.
Given all this, selling a law practice for the purpose of cashing out goodwill
is practically unavailable because the attorney’s ability to recoup the required
payout through the continued practice of law would dissipate with the sale of
the practice or practice area.  As discussed in Travis, inequity still exists in
saddling a practitioner with a single, unchangeable award produced by
classifying a practitioner’s goodwill as a marital asset subject to division.  In
Travis, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that “[e]stablishing earning
capacity is much less speculative than trying to establish a good will value of
a law practice.  Projected earnings can be considered in establishing support
alimony which, unlike property division of good will, may be adjusted upward
or downward at a later date.”294
V. Conclusion
While it appears that the 2008 amendment to Oklahoma Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.17 has legislatively abrogated Travis by making an
attorney’s goodwill a saleable business asset that properly can be included in
a marital property division, Travis, if ever challenged, should not be
overturned.  To change a common law rule in Oklahoma, a statute must speak
directly to the rule it seeks to change.   A court could logically construe the295
new version of Rule 1.17 as merely providing for the sale of an attorney’s
goodwill should it come into existence, not stating that an attorney has
goodwill in his or her practice.  Such a finding would satisfy the court’s
precedent on changing common law by statute because the inclusion of
goodwill in the ethical rule allowing a lawyer to sell his or her law practice is
not specific enough to change the classification of an attorney’s goodwill from
personal to enterprise.  
Nonetheless, the equity rationales used in the Travis decision still apply
despite changes in the 2008 version of Rule 1.17, even if a reviewing court
finds that a lawyer’s goodwill is now a saleable business asset.  While the
ability to sell law practices, including goodwill, is now ethically permissible
by the new version of Rule 1.17,  legal practices still are virtually not296
saleable, especially for the purpose of divorce property divisions.  Unlike
other professions, the ethical constraints provided in the rule itself,
specifically the requirement of cessation in the practice or practice area sold,
294. Travis v. Travis, 1990 OK 57, ¶ 12, 795 P.2d 96, 100.
295. See supra note 269-70, 288-89 and accompanying text.
296. OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.17 (Supp. 2008).
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prohibit lawyers from cashing out their goodwill in sale if they wish to remain
as privately practicing attorneys.  Equity dictates that divorcing attorneys not
be forced to quit practicing law in order to satisfy a divorce settlement
obligation.
Further, valuation of goodwill in any profession is highly speculative, but
this problem is much greater for the legal profession.  Generally, no
comparable sales exist to evaluate an attorney’s practice or goodwill.   The297
valuation method employed by either spouse’s expert could completely alter
the outcome of the decision.  Even if a jurisdiction has rejected or adopted
certain valuation methods, as Oklahoma has done,  the goodwill value can298
vary even within a particular valuation method depending upon the expert who
performs the computation.  Since there will probably not be a sale, the
valuation will be inherently unrealistic.299
Finally, the award of support alimony is much more equitable than property
settlements that cannot be modified.  This is especially true in the practice of
law where the income stream can fluctuate from year to year depending on the
needs of clients.  Nonetheless, if Travis is overruled and the goodwill of a law
practice is divided as marital property, the award of at least a substantial
portion of that goodwill as support alimony and not property division could
address the inequity of dividing goodwill.  An award of this nature would
allow the support award to be modified if circumstances warrant an
adjustment of the original award.300
For these reasons, Travis should be upheld if it is ever challenged. 
Notwithstanding the 2008 change to Rule 1.17, the underlying rationale for
the Travis rule still applies.   Considering the realities faced by the sole301
practitioner today, the Travis rule continues to present an equitable solution
to a troubling question.  Since lawyers cannot readily sell their practices like
other professionals, modifiable support alimony awards present the most just
and efficient basis for dividing marital property while protecting both parties
from substantial, unforeseen circumstances.  In addition, support awards
provide the flexibility needed to help practitioners face the inevitable
fluctuations in income inherent in the solo practice of law.  Travis has
provided balanced and fair precedent for practicing attorneys in Oklahoma for
297. Rosin, supra note 35, at 350.
298. Traczyk v. Traczyk, 1995 OK 22, ¶¶ 12-15, 891 P.2d 1277, 1280, superceded by statute
on other grounds as stated by 1999 OK 57, ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 1025, 1028-29; Mocnik v. Mocnik,
1992 OK 99, ¶¶ 20-21, 838 P.2d 500, 505.
299. White, supra note 31, at 524.
300. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 134(D) (2001).
301. Travis v. Travis, 1990 OK 57, ¶¶ 12-13, 795 P.2d 96, 100.
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almost 19 years, and Oklahoma courts should follow the rule of stare decisis
by upholding it.
Returning to my initial hypothetical:  Beth Counsel’s legal advice to Abe
Lawyer accords with the law as it exists today in Oklahoma.  After his wife’s
attorney did not challenge Travis based on the revision to Oklahoma Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.17, Abe Lawyer is granted a “D-I-V-O-R-C-E”  from302
Oasis.  Abe’s professional goodwill has been left untouched, and his practice
of law and life continues.
Jennifer D. Ary-Hogue
302. WYNETTE, supra note 2.
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